Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 9

Issue 3

Article 3

4-15-1982

The Use of Aviation Accident Reports by Civil Litigants: The
Historical Development of 49 U.S.C. Section 1441(e)
Walter A. T. Welch Jr.
John E. Faulk

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Air and Space Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Evidence Commons, Legislation
Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Walter A. T. Welch Jr. and John E. Faulk The Use of Aviation Accident Reports by Civil Litigants: The
Historical Development of 49 U.S.C. Section 1441(e), 9 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 3 (1982)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol9/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

The Use Of Aviation Accident
Reports By Civil Litigants: The
Historical Development Of 49
U.S.C. Section 1441 (e) t

WALTER A. T. WELCH, JR.*
JUDGE JOHN E. FAULK**

When aviation accidents occur, the National Transportation Safety
Board conducts an investigation to determine the conditions, circumstances, and ultimately the probable cause of the accident. There is a federal statutory privilege which renders these reports, as well as testimony
from the attending investigator,inadmissible as evidence in any suit or action arisingfrom the accident. However, certainjudicially created except The opinions expressed in this article are those of the individual authors
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Civil Aeronautics Board, the
National Transportation Safety Board, the Department of Transportation, or the
United States.
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tions have arisen which permit portions of the report and certain
investigatortestimony to be admitted into evidence.
The authors delineate and analyze these exceptions as they discuss the
trend toward increased report and testimony admissibility. The authors
conclude with a recommended statutory revision which would set out a
predictable and consistent scheme for determining admissibility of National TransportationSafety Board aviation accident reports and testimony from the investigatorswho preparedthem.

I.

INTRODUCTION

When Congress established the Department of Transportation,
it declared that the general welfare, economic growth, and stability of the nation required, among other things, policies and programs conducive to safe transportation.' The American use of
transportation is extensive. In aviation, for instance, scheduled
air carriers made more than 10,000,000 takeoffs and landings in
1980.2

Given this mobile environment, the circumstances creating a
potential for accidents are almost infinite. In 1980, general aviation flying accounted for 1,375 fatalities in this nation.3 Total
"transportation accidents" claim American lives to a degree comparable with heart disease and cancer. Just as the medical community of doctors has set out to counteract the tide of lives lost
due to disease, Congress has given the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB)4 authority to maximize safety through accident investigation in an attempt to cure the disease of carelessness. In the United States, this authority to investigate and
prevent accident reoccurrence is delegated to the Board5 for five
1. (a) The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare, the economic growth and stability of the Nation and its security require the development of national transportation policies and programs conducive to
the provision of fast, safe, efficient, and convenient transportation at the
lowest cost consistent therewith and with other national objectives, including the efficient utilization and conservation of the Nation's resources.
49 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976).
2. NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ANNuAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
11 (1980).
3. Id.
4. The term "Board" will be used for both the Civil Aeronautics Board and
the National Transportation Safety Board.
5. (d) There are hereby transferred to and vested in the Secretary all
functions, powers, and duties of the Civil Aeronautics Board, and of the
Chairman, members, officers, and offices thereof under titles VI (72 Stat.
775) 49 U.S.C. § 1421 et seq. and VII (72 Stat. 781) 49 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended: Provided however, that
these functions, powers, and duties are hereby transferred to and shall be
exercised by the National Transportation Safety Board made pursuant to
the exercise of the functions, powers, and duties enumerated in this subsection shall be administratively final, and appeals as authorized by law or
this chapter shall be taken directly to the courts.
49 U.S.C. § 1655(d) (1976).
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modes of transportation, one of the most important being
6
aviation.
Under the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, the board is
charged with authority to "investigate or cause to be investigated,
and determine the facts, conditions and circumstances and the
probable cause" 7 of any civil accident. At the completion of the
Board's air crash investigation, a written report is prepared. By
an act of Congress, section 701(e) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, these aviation accident reports were to remain privileged,
being used solely to ensure future air safety. The language of section 701(e) provided: "no part of any report or reports of the
Board or the Authority relating to any accident, or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or
action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such
report or reports." 8
By that express privilege-creating statute 9 the documents
which comprise the reports of the Board following an accident investigation are not to be disclosed through the normal discovery
procedure of the courts. Statutes of this kind are an anomaly.
They are considered an absolute and complete bar to discovery.10
In 1950, a "reasonable argument [could] be made that Section
701(e) preclude [d] opinion testimony by [Board] employees, but
[then] there [were] no court opinions on the question."" Today,
however, there are numerous decisions ruling upon the use of aviation accident reports by civil litigants. 12 This paper will examine
6. The others are rail, highway, marine, and pipeline.
7. 49 U.S.C. § 1653 (1976).
8. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 701(e), 52 Stat. 1013 (repealed 1958).
9. This type of statute "expressly privileges the document at issue from disclosure in court proceedings." Comment, Discovery of Government Documents
and the Official Information Privilege, 76 COLUM. L REV. 142, 149 (1976).
10. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2019
(1970).
11. See Simpson, Use of Aircraft Accident InvestigationInformation in Actions
for Damages, 17 J. AIR L. "ND COM. 283, 291 (1960) where the author discusses the
scope of the privilege granted by section 701(e) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of

1938.
12. Benna v. Reeder Flying Serv., Inc., 578 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1978); Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1978); American Airlines, Inc. v. United
States, 418 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1969); Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628
(3d Cir. 1963); Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951); Universal Airlines, Inc. v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Kline v.
Martin, 345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1972); Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v.
Frank, 227 F. Supp. 803 (D. Conn. 1963); Tansey v. Transcontinental &Western Air,
Inc., 97 F. Supp. 458 (D.D.C. 1949); Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, Inc., 97 F.

those rulings and their impact upon the statutory privilege given
these aviation accident reports.
II. NTSB ACCIDENT REPORTS
A. DistinguishingFacts and Observationsfrom Opinions,
Conclusions, and Findings
In 1947, Ritts v. American Oversea Air;linesl3 decided that testimony given by a witness before the CAB (the NTSB's predecessor as to aircraft accident investigation) was not privileged and
could be used to refresh the witness's recollection or impeach his
testimony in a trial proceeding. The court determined from its
reading of section 701(e), that only the Board's reports themselves were privileged. The judge assumed that the prohibition
against the use of the Board's accident reports was "based upon
the fact that the reports would contain findings and conclusions,
the receipt of which at trial might be prejudicial to a party who
had no part in the investigation of the Board and no opportunity
to be heard by the Board."14
Two years later, in Tansey v. Transcontinentaland Western Air,
Inc.,15 the court relied upon the reasoning in Ritts and held that it
was quite possible Congress intended to withhold only the conclusions of the investigating agency from use. The court drew a
distinction between the information (factual matter) received by
the Board during its investigation and its reports which contained
opinions and conclusions.
The Board had an opportunity to exhibit its displeasure with
the Tansey decision in Universal Airlines v. Eastern Airlines.16
The Board filed an amicus curiae brief, wherein it argued against
the use as evidence of testimony by its investigators when the
cause of action sought damages. The Board gave five reasons in
support of withholding the information: (1) the Board's sole purSupp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Adkins v. Lester, 530 P.2d 11 (Alaska 1975); Murphy v.
Colorado Aviation, Inc., 588 P.2d 877 (Colo. App. 1978); Todd v. Weikle, 36 Md. App.
663, 376 A.2d 104 (1977); McCutcheon v. Larsen, 333 P.2d 1013 (Mont. 1959); Myers v.
Cessna Aircraft Corp., 553 P.2d 355 (Or. 1976).
13. 97 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1947). The court held that the provision of the
Civil Aeronautics Act which excluded reports of the Board from admission into evidence in an action relating to an accident or investigation thereof did not bar the
use of testimony of a witness examined by the Board during its investigation.
14. Id. at 458.
15. 97 F. Supp. 458 (D.D.C. 1949). In a suit for personal injuries sustained in an
airplane accident, the court permitted the plaintiff to examine accident investigations and reports required to be made to the CAB.
16. 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951). The court held that where the CAB investigation of airplane accidents is the sole source of evidence relevant to the position
and condition of the aircraft involved and reasonably available to the parties, the

investigation report must be made available in an action for damages.
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pose in preparing accident reports is to gain information in order
to prevent a reoccurrence of similar accidents and not to provide
evidence for private litigants; (2) refusal to release information
encourages frank disclosure; (3) testimony by one investigator
might differ from the final determination by the Board; (4) testimony would tend to influence civil liabilities; and (5) time of the
investigators would be taken up when they testified as experts.17
In its brief, the Board contended that the appellate court's decision on the admissibility of its accident investigator's testimony
concerning observations, opinions, and reports "would establish a
precedent not only of interest to [the Board], but of great importance to the public."18
As to the first issue regarding observation, the Universal Airlines decision recognized that the Board's investigators may often
be the only witnesses to facts such as the location of wreckage
prior to its removal. The appellate court concluded that it was not
error to permit such testimony; in fact, use of deposition testimony taken from CAB investigations was preferred because it
caused less interference with the investigators' official duties.
When the deposition is refused or inadequate, the court may then
compel attendance at trial.
Secondly, Universal Airlines reasoned that conclusions and
opinions of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the
Board, or any testimony directly or indirectly reflecting those
opinions, would generally be held inadmissible. Along with the
statutory prohibition of section 701(e) (the predecessor of section
1441(e)), the court noted that administrative hearings and investigative proceedings are inadmissible for evidentiary reasons. In
particular, the decision pointed out the ex parte nature of the administrative proceedings, the improper character of the evidence,
the irrelevance of the proffered testimony, and that the evidence
would be hearsay based upon hearsay.
Finally, Universal Airlines maintained the confidentiality of the
CAB's reports from both direct and indirect disclosure. The court
acknowledged a line of decisions that supported the CAB's right
to reasonable regulations protecting their reports, records, and
regulations barring testimony by their employees concerning
17. Id. at 997-1000.
18. Id. at 997.

those privileged documents. 19
The Universal Airlines decision became the impetus for a succession of court rulings. It played an important, although confused, role in Lobel v. American Airlines.20 The Lobel decision
pointed out that the Board's report "consisted wholly of investigator's personal observations with no opinions or conclusions about
the condition of the plane after the accident." 21 The accident report was admitted into the trial proceedings. The court cited and
applied a rule it perceived to have been established in the Universal Airlines case. While Universal Airlines objected to the ex
parte nature of the Board's hearings and the improper nature of
the evidence, Lobel reasoned that cross-examination was available at trial, and because the information could have been extracted through such a method, the evidence was proper. In
answer to Universal Airlines's objection to the reports as hearsay
upon hearsay, the court allowed the report to be admitted only as
a past recollection recorded because it was auxiliary to the direct
22
testimony of the investigator given in deposition.
The court appeared to reason that when admission of the report
does not violate the rules of evidence, then, in accordance with
the decision in Universal Airlines, the statutory privilege is negated. Recall, however, that Universal Airlines excluded the reports as violative of the rules of evidence, thereby obviating the
need to confront the challenge of privilege under 49 U.S.C. section
1441(e).
Regardless of its misapplication of the facts in Universal Airlines, the Lobel decision resulted in the admission into evidence
of Board Aviation Accident Reports, notwithstanding the clear
language of section 701(e) of the Civil Aeronautics Act. The
court, in part, allowed those reports into evidence by drawing
what was to be a lasting distinction between facts and observations on the one hand and opinions, conclusions, and findings on
the other.
B. Admission of Opinion Testimony
The original version of section 701(e) of the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 was reenacted twenty years later as the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and codified as 49 U.S.C. section 1441(e). The lan19. Id. at 999.
20. 192 F.2d 217, 220 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952) (in an action

by a passenger for damages arising out of a crash, a CAB deposition and report
containing personal observations about the condition of the aircraft following a
crash were properly admitted into evidence).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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guage remained unchanged, yet the court in Berguido v. Eastern
Airlines23 viewed "the judicial interpretations of this section [as
24
having] not been too extensive or precise."
In Berguido, the court declined to follow Lobel and held that
section 1441(e) precluded Board investigators from testifying, except as to their "personal observations about the scene of the
crash and the condition of the plane afterwards." 25 The court concluded that to adopt the reasoning in Lobel would be to follow an
argument which blurred the purpose of the statutory privilege
26
with other policies affecting the admissibility of evidence.
Lobel concluded that the goal of section 701(e) was to preclude
the use in evidence of Board reports which expressed agency
views and opinions which would unwisely penetrate areas "within
the functions of courts and juries to decide. ' 27 Berguido, on the
other hand, saw the fundamental policy underlying section
701(e)'s modern counterpart, section 1441(e), as one of "compromise between the interests of those who would adopt a policy of
absolute privilege in order to secure full and frank disclosure as
to the probable cause and thus help prevent future accidents 28
and the countervailing policy of making available all accident information to litigants in a civil suit."29 "The primary thrust of the
provision is to exclude [Board] reports which express agency
30
views as to the probable cause of the accident."
The court's decision spoke of a balancing test and held that
opinion testimony came within the rule of section 1441(e). However, testimony relating to personal observations of the Board investigator about the scene of the crash and the subsequent
condition of the plane was held admissible because it was not
23. 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963).
24. Id. at 631.
25. Id.

26. Id.
27. 192 F.2d at 220.
28. In UniversalAirlines, the court stated that "the Board had been instructed
by Congress to investigate aircraft accidents solely for the purpose of gaining the

information necessary to prevent the recurrence of similar accidents, and not for
the purpose of securing evidence or providing witnesses for the benefit of parties
and private litigation." 188 F.2d at 998.
29. Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, 317 F.2d at 631-32. See Tansey v. Transcontinental and Western Airlines, Inc., 97 F. Supp. at 461 for a similar view of the policy
behind a statute privileging reports of accident investigations.
30. 317 F.2d at 632.

"within the ambit of privilege." 31 The testimony, the court concluded, could not be opinion testimony since it in no way reflected the Board's findings as to the probable cause of the
accident.
In Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Frank (Frank I),32
the court expanded the holding in Berguido. Testimony about the
probable cause of the accident was the only matter to be excluded
from evidence. Other conclusions or opinions by the Board were
held to be admissible. The court held that testimony "which lies
within or close to the ambit of the ultimate question in the case,
which the trier will have to decide, should be excluded. On the
other hand, conclusions and opinions which are outside the area
of the ultimate question may be admitted, even though they have
been incorporatedin the report of the Board."33
The results reached in Berguido and Frank did not last long.
One year and one month later the court amended its initial ruling
because the "ultimate question" test proved to be more confusing
than helpful. So, in Frank 1134 the court returned to what it considered a more workable rule. All evaluation, opinion, and conclusion evidence contained within the Board's report would be
barred in its entirety. The court held that this was the "only practical way to give adequate effect and to fulfill the purpose" of sec35
tion 1441(e).
The inroads taken by Frank I in liberalizing section 1441(e)
were only temporarily erradicated by Frank I. Five years later,
another court, in American Airlines v. United States,3 6 established
its own interpretation of the scope of section 1441(e). The court
determined that "a very sophisticated evaluation of the data had
to be made." 37 The court decided the rule in Frank II would

cause uncertainty in sorting fact from opinion. Therefore, the
court concluded "it would be better to exclude opinion testimony
only when it embraces the probable cause of the accident or the
negligence of the defendant" (the ultimate issues).38
By 1971, other courts were abandoning the "simple approach"
and returning to the original rule as expressed in Frank I. In Falk
31. Id.
32. 214 F. Supp. 803 (D. Conn. 1963).
33. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
34. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Frank, 227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn.
1964).
35. Id. at 949.
36. 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969) (qualified testimony reaching beyond merely
personal observations is admissible where it does not presume to be the official
opinion of the CAB).
37. Id. at 196.

38. Id.

Use of Aviation Accident Reports
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v. United States,39 it was held that when the government acts as a
litigant rather than as a regulatory agency, its status is akin to
that of a private citizen. 40 Support for that ruling was drawn from
49 U.S.C. section 1654(e), which provides that the Board shall
make public, among other things, all of its reports. The court assumed that legislation which made available the Board's reports
to the public domain also rendered them accessible to civil liti41
gants and admissible in evidence.
One year later, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia also adopted the American Airlines rules of
the "ultimate issue" test. In Kline v. Martin,4 2 the court vitiated
the Falk requirement that the government be a litigant by noting
that "neither of these agencies [NTSB and FAA] nor the United
States is a party to this action."4 3 Therefore, with that decision it
became evident that the American Airlines rule and the "ultimate
issue" test were winning acceptance. Opinion testimony by the
Board's investigators would no longer be absolutely barred under
section 1441(e). Unless the opinions embraced the probable
cause of the accident or the negligence of the defendant, the court
might rule in favor of admitting the testimony.

III.
A.

RECENT FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS

The Trend Continues

In 1978, three decisions furthered the trend of liberal interpretations away from earlier cases which sought to bar or delimit the
use of the Board work product in civil actions for damages. The
first case was Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison," decided in the
Tenth Circuit. Testimony of a Board investigator regarding his
observations at the scene of the accident was allowed into evi39. 53 F.R.D. 113 (D. Conn. 1971). In a tort claims action against the federal
government, the oral opinion of the government's chief investigator may be sought
in deposition testimony because such reports are public documents available for
inspection by all litigants).

40. Id. at 115.
41. See Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, 317 F.2d at 632.
42. 345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1972). The court required the NTSB air safety investigator and the general aviations inspector for the FAA, both of whom had conducted investigations at the site of the airplane crash, to answer depositions
regarding the cause of the accident, even where answering questions involved the
giving of opinion.
43. Id. at 32.
44. 569 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1978).

dence even though the plaintiff raised claims of inadmissibility
under section 1441(e) and title 49, section 835.3(b) of the Code of
Federal Regulations. 45 The latter regulation essentially creates a
jural right protecting Board employees and limiting their testimony to mere factual information obtained in the course of the investigation. Prohibited by the regulation is testimony "regarding
matters beyond the scope of the investigations" 46 or "opinion tes47
timony concerning the cause of the accident."
The court allowed the Board investigator and an FAA maintenance supervisor to testify about their observations at the accident site and the manner in which they undertook their
investigation. The court held the testimony of the investigators
admissible because it did not go to the "proximate cause of the
crash." 48 Therefore, it viewed the testimony as not subject to an
"absolute prohibition."49
Another recent interpretation of section 1441(e) was handed
down by the Ninth Circuit in Benna v. Reeder Flying Service,
Inc.5 0 The issue was whether it was error for the jury to view the
Board's accident report (statutorily inadmissible as evidence),
where the report as a whole was merely cumulative of the other
voluminous evidence produced at trial. The report had been left
on the judge's bench and the jury mistakenly viewed it along with
other evidence. The court determined that the report did not include the Board's official conclusion nor any opinion as to the
probable cause of the accident. Nevertheless, on the basis of section 1441(e) alone, the court found it to be error for the jury to see
the accident report even though it consisted primarily of factual
evidence. This finding would infer a return to a conservative
reading of the statutory privilege afforded accident reports. However, the actual ruling of the court suggests only a token deference to the statute.
While there was error, the court determined it was but "harmless error." 51 In summarizing the ruling, the court stated that
where there is substantial evidence to support the verdict and the
accident report is merely cumulative and "not of a character to
prejudice the unsuccessful party," 52 then consideration by the
jury of the accident report is harmless.
45.
46.
47.
48.

49 C.F.R. § 835.3(b) (1978).
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id. at 551.

49. Id.
50. 578 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1978).
51. Id. at 271.

52. Id. at 272.
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Probably the most important recent decision to address the issue of admissibility of aircraft accident reports is Seymour v.
United States?3 The court, citing American Airlines, reemphasized that opinion testimony by Board employees should only be
embrace~the probable
excluded when such testimony 4
cause of the accident or the negligence of the defendant.
The facts in Seymour reveal the United States was the defendant. It was uncontested that the plaintiff did not participate in
any way in the investigation of the accident, nor did the plaintiff
have any influence on the preparation of the report. The court, in
allowing the plaintiff to use the reports, held that "since these reports were prepared by defendant's employees, the plaintiff
should not be required to shoulder the extreme burden of locating, subpoenaing and deposing all Army and federal investigators
involved." 54 The court then announced the most expansive rule
since American Airlines: "If the defendant honestly believes that
its own employees erred in certain fact findings and notations, defendant can depose them to establish the inaccuracy. Placing the
burden on defendant to disprove the findings is justified since defendant's employees prepared these reports." 55
The court's decision in Seymour v. United States represents a
complete reversal from the rule stated in section 1441(e). The
Board's aviation and accident report was not only stripped of its
privileged. nature, but its contents and findings were elevated to a
presumption of accuracy. Moreover, the government employees
of the Board will be saddled with a conflict of interest and a challenge to the loyalty owed to their employer. By investigating an
accident that involved the United States Government, these investigators would begin their undertaking with the knowledge
that their report will not only serve to prevent future accidents,
but might also be used to form a basis of liability against the
United States. Prior to the Seymour decision, the courts were reluctant to grant such weight to the Board investigators' reports.
B.

Other JustificationsFor Circumventing The Rule

Not all courts have found it necessary to narrowly interpret the
17,141 (1978). The court held that a NTSB factual re53. 15 Av. Cas. (CCH)
port concerning an aircraft collision is admissible into evidence in a civil action.
54. Id. at 17,142 (quoting American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180,
196 (5th Cir. 1969)).
55. Id.

intent of section 1441(e) in order to avoid its restrictions. For a
variety of reasons some courts have been able to circumvent the
statutory language, thereby permitting accident reports to be admitted into evidence.
In Faith M. Lewis Kochendorfer,56 the Court of Claims needed
only to examine the statute's wording to decide that "Congressional reference case[ s] ... are arguably not a 'suitor actionfor
damages' in the conventional sense [and], 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e)
Report." 57
Ie
would not seem to baIN
Even if it is to be assumed that in fashioning Section 1441(e), Congress
intended to extend the confidentiality that it conferred on CAB accident
investigation reports to Congressional reference-type proceedings . . . it
lift[s] that cloak [when] it include[s] the Report among the evidentiary
materials that it transmitted to the Chief Commissioner for his considera58
tion in arriving at his ultimate recommendation to the Congress.

The ingenuity of the trial attorney has often resulted in evading
the prohibition. One attorney accomplished this by using interrogatories to get the Board report into evidence indirectly. He
embodied a portion of the report into his interrogatory and then
used the interrogatory in evidence.59
Conversely, an attorney's lack of diligence has allowed his opponent to bring accident reports into evidence because an objection was not promptly made. 60 Once admitted, the opposing party
waives his continued objection if he also elects to introduce portions of the report into evidence. 61 When a report is accepted into
evidence over a party's objections, the opposing party must have
adequately preserved his rights. In addition, the party does "not
fulfill the duty that is upon the objecting party"62 until he "makes
clear to the district court that he is pressing his point, and what

point it

iS."63

64

He cannot let the court assume he has 4accepted a

ruling."
Another argument that might result in the admission into evidence of the Board accident report is the equitable principle of
mutuality. 65 If the accident report is released to one party in the
56. 193 Ct. Cl. 1045 (1971) (negligence action under the Federal Tort Claims
Act stemming from a mid-air collision between an Air National Guard military jet
plane on flight training maneuvers and a private airplane of decedent).
57. Id. at 1059 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 1060.
59. Wenminger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499, 519-21 (D.C. Del. 1964).
60. Israel v. United States, 247 F.2d 426, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1957).

61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Krause v. Chartier, 406 F.2d 898, 901 (1st Cir. 1968).
Id.
Id.

65. The reference to the equitable doctrine of mutuality refers to mutuality of

estoppel which is one of eight essential elements generally required under the
doctrine of collateral estoppel. Those eight elements are:
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litigation, then fairness requires it be given to the other.66
Often, a party will claim the NTSB report is a record made in
the regular course of business and therefore admissible in evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence.67 In Palmer v. Hoffman, 68 the United States Supreme Court interpreted this

business records provision to be inapplicable. The Court denied
the use in evidence of an accident report prepared by the railroad.
The rationale was that parties should not be permitted to manufacture self-serving evidence. In Seymour v. United States,6 9 the
court deemed the decision in Palmer not binding when the United
States is the defendant and another party seeks to use the accident reports in evidence. The evidence offered is no longer selfserving to the originator.
Similarly, when the government is the defendant, accident reports have been used in contravention of section 1441(e) on the
basis of a conflicting code-49 U.S.C. § 1654(e). That section pro(a) a suit and an adversary proceeding;
(b) a final judgment;
(c)

a decision on the merits;

(d) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(e) identity of the parties;
(f) identity of subject matter or issues;
(g) capacity of parties; and
(h) mutuality of estoppel.
Amann v. Tankersley, 149 Ind. App. 501, 509, 273 N.E.2d 772, 777 (1971).
The mutuality doctrine refers to the situation where both parties are aware of
the fact that a particular issue may be significant in a later proceeding and were
originally afforded a fair and equal opportunity to litigate the issue. If neither
party raises such an issue in the state court, the parties will be precluded, or mutually estopped, from raising that issue in later proceedings.
66. In O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 38 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), an Air Force accident report released to the aircraft manufacturer for safety reasons was held to be
grounds for release to the plaintiff suing the manufacturer. There was "good
cause," under FED. R. Crv. P. 34, for discovery and inspection of the records of fact
but not for any part of the report dealing with opinions, speculation, recommendations, or discussion of Air Force policy.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1978) states: "1975-Pub. L. 93-595 struck out subsec.
(a) which had made admissible as evidence writings or records made as memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event if made in the regular course of business ......
68. 318 U.S. 109 (1943). The Court stated that:
In short, it is manifest that in this case these reports are not for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business. Unlike payrolls,
accounts receivable, accounts payable, bills of lading and the like, these
reports are calculated for use essentially in the court not in the business.
Their primary utility is in litigating, not in railroading.
Id. at 114.
69. See note 52 nupra.

vides that "all reports" of the Board, are considered part of the
public domain. The cases that have allowed the accident reports
to be admitted into evidence have done so even though section
1654(e) is limited by the words "except as otherwise provided by
statute," 70 i.e., section 1441(e).
One notable decision held section 1441(e) should be interpreted
so as to avoid elimination of accident reports when they provide
the only source of information. 71 That same case suggested that
at times the privilege afforded accident reports might be avoided
by receiving into evidence the subcommittee's reports.
In another decision, 72 the plaintiff argued that the investigator
working for the Board should be allowed to testify because he
was actually employed by the FAA and section 1441(e) restricts
73
only Board employees from testifying.
C. Protectingthe Privilege
In spite of the widespread trend to admit Board accident reports into evidence, some courts have upheld and protected the
privileged nature of these reports. In 1977, a United States district
court judge indicated he would not likely construe the section
protecting the confidentiality of accident reports "in a manner
74
harmonious with prior interpretations in the aviation cases."

Thereafter, he refused to admit the Board report into evidence, although his decision was based upon other evidentiary reasons.
There exist historic75 and recent

76

statutes which protect the

confidentiality of the Board's aviation accident reports from use
in any proceeding for damages. The clear language of the legisla70. See, e.g., Falk v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 113 (D.C. Conn. 1971) where the
court construed § 1441(e) in light of new § 1654(e).
71. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Frank, 214 F. Supp. 803, 805 (D.C.
Conn. 1963).
72. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Harvey, 558 P.2d 879, 883 (Alaska 1976) (wrongful
death action of a pilot and passenger in the crash of a private aircraft).
73. But see 49 C.F.R. §§ 9.7, 9.11, 9.13 (1978). Section 9.7 provides:
Subject to Sections 9.9 and 9.13, an employee of the Department of
Transportation may not testify as an expert or opinion witness, as to any
matter related to his duties or the functions of the Department, in any legal proceeding between private litigants, for the following reasons:
(a) To conserve the time of employees for conducting official business.
(b) To minimize the possibility of involving the Department in controversial issues that are not related to its mission.
(c) To prevent the possibility that the public will misconstrue variances
between the personal opinions of employees and departmental policy.
(d) To avoid spending the time and money of the United States for private purposes.
74. Complaint of American Export Lines, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 454, 459 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
75. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 701(e), 52 Stat. 1013 (repealed 1968).
76. 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e) (Supp. I 1979).
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ture is repeated in several different sections of the United States
Code.7 7 Not only are the reports themselves confidential, but testimony by those who prepare the reports is protected as a jural
right. Testimony by Board employees is limited in scope. They
may not testify as to the "ultimate view" of the Board concerning
the "cause or probable cause of an accident." 78 Board employees
may only testify as to the "factual information they obtained during the course of the accident investigation, including factual evaluations . . .,79
Specifically, a Board employee may use a copy of his factual accident report only to "refresh his memory."8 0 These restrictions
apply equally to former Board employees. 81 While the FAA is not
covered by these code provisions, other regulations8 2 provide similar rules for its employees.
Any pretrial ruling affecting the use of the accident report in evidence is of necessity reviewable at later stages but is subject to
the circumstances at trial that may have been relevant to admissibility.83 However, once the court rules on the admissibility of the

Board's accident report, a party cannot allude to what is contained therein. If it were to so allude, it might be "so prejudicial
to [the opponent's] ...

case that it .

..

is ground for a new

trial."84 Other cases have even argued that dismissal of an appeal
is an appropriate "sanction against the Government for its violation of the statutory provisions regarding the use of reports of the
National Transportation Safety Board."85
77. See also 49 U.S.C. § 1903(c) (amended 1978) and 49 U.S.C. § 835.2 (1978).
Section 1903(c) states: "No part of any report of the Board, relating to any accident or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit

or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or reports." All functions, powers, and duties of the Civil Aeronautics Board were terminated or transferred by Section 1551 of this title, effective in part on Dec. 31,
1981, in part on Jan. 1, 1983, and in part on Jan. 1, 1985.
78. 49 C.F.R. § 835.3(a) (1978).
79. Id. § 835.3(b).
80. Id. § 835.4.
81. Id. § 835.7.
82. See note 72 supra.
83. LeRoy v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 344 F.2d 266, 274 (2d Cir. 1965)
(Lumbard, C.J.) (tort action brought on behalf of a passenger killed in defendant's
airplane).
84. Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, 35 F.R.D. 200, 211 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (second
published decision in this case). See also Hockaday v. Red Line, Inc., 174 F.2d 154,
156 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
85. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. United States, 570 F.2d 1197, 1200 n.3 (4th

Sanctions are not limited to party litigants. Unauthorized communications by the Board's employees are prohibited even
outside of the court's proceedings.8 6 A "substantive communication" may either be written or oral so long as it is apposite to the
merits of the proceeding. Wrongful disclosure in violation of the
privilege is a serious matter, and criminal sanctions under the law
are provided.8 7
IV. SUMMARY
The succession of rulings from Ritts to Seymour has resulted in
an erosion of the absolute privilege and confidentiality that section 1441(e) intended to provide Board accident reports. The
court in Ritts strictly adhered to the language of section 701(e).
The Board accident report was entirely excluded from the trial
proceedings whereas factual testimony by the Board's investigator was permitted. In Tansey, the court divided the Board's work
product into separate classifications. Opinions and conclusions
constituted the "report." Data collected by the Board's investigators was described as factual or informational "matter" and therefore, subject to discovery.
The decisions in Universal and Lobel combined their discussion of section 701(e) with an analysis of other evidentiary policies. Universal deemed the Board's reports to be ex parte in
nature and inadmissible as hearsay. Lobel misapplied the Universal holding and found that the accident report was admissible
under the rules of evidence. The issue of privilege was never adequately addressed in the Lobel decision.
The court in Berguido departed from the four prior decisions in
its application of section 1441(e). The Berguido decision
criticized Lobel for commingling the purpose of section 581 with
other evidentiary policies. Berguido also ended the distinction
drawn in Ritts between investigator's testimony and their reCir. 1978) (subrogation suit involving insurers as subrogees against United States
and four air traffic controllers on duty at time of crash).

The court, however, found that reference to the report in the government's appellate brief did not warrant sanctions because such reference did not contravene
49 U.S.C. § 1903(c) and 49 U.S.C. § 1441(e).
86. 14 C.F.R. § 300.2(a) (1979). Section 300.2 states:
Prohibited communications.

(a)

Basic requirement. Except as provided in paragraphs (c), (d), and

(e) there shall be no substantive communications in either direction be-

tween any concerned Board employee and any interested person outside
the Board, concerning a public proceeding, until after final disposition of

the proceeding, other than as provided by Federal Statute or published
Board rule or order.
Id. (emphasis added).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976).
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ported findings. This was seen as a policy of form rather than
substance. In addition, Berguido contradicted the rationale in
Universal that suggested prevention of future accidents was the
sole purpose of the accident investigation report. The court chose
to establish a balancing test that weighed the Board's concern for
confidentiality against a policy that favored the litigant's accessibility to the information. The pivotal holding in Berguido was its
departure from the Tansey decision. In Berguido, opinions expressed within the accident report were no longer granted absolute privilege; henceforth, only those opinions suggesting the
probable cause of the accident were to be excluded from the trier
of fact.
Following Berguido, a line of cases firmly established that section 1441(e) applied only to testimony that evaded the ambit of
the ultimate question/issue or that dealt with the probable cause
of the accident. Those cases included Frank I, American Airlines,
Falk, Kline, Keen, and Seymour.
The requirements of a "very sophisticated" analysis of the evidence convinced the courts in American Airlines and Keen to rely
upon the findings of the Board's experts. In Falk and Seymour,
the government, as preparer of the accident reports, was also the
defendant. This dual role, the court reasoned, justified admission
of the accident report's findings into evidence. The prerequisite
that the United States be a party was eliminated in the Kline decision, where the Board's findings were admitted into a trial involving private litigants. In addition, the Keen decision permitted
the Board's employees to testify with the proviso that their testimony not purport to be official agency opinion. Finally, the Seymour ruling established a presumption of accuracy in the findings
of the aviation accident report whenever the government was the
defendant. The United States Government had the burden of
challenging the reported findings since they were prepared by its
agency.
The last thirty years have witnessed a gradual, yet definite,
weakening of the confidentiality granted to NTSB aviation accident reports. Several courts excluded those reports because they
perceived a danger that the Board's investigation would usurp the
fact-finding role of the judge or jury. If that is the true purpose
for restricting the use of accident reports, then the courts may
have properly admitted the reports into evidence. The courts
should be able to exercise their discretion to protect the role of

the judge/jury as fact finder. The trial court must also use its
judgment in determining to what degree it will allow its rulings to
be influenced by outside agencies and their findings.
Other courts have found "[t]he fundamental policy underlying
1441(e)... to be a compromise between.., absolute privilege in
order to secure full and frank disclosure ... and prevent future
accidents, and the countervailing policy of making available all accident information to litigants .... ,,88 It would appear that the
trend of the courts has been to shift this balance of conflicting interests to a policy of admitting the reports which is weighed in
favor of the individual litigant.
V.

A RECOMMENDATION

The time may be ripe for Congress to reexamine the legitimacy
of the privilege specifically afforded NTSB accident reports.
Many questions remain to be answered. What has been the impact of the expanded access to and use of these reports in trial
proceedings? Has the decline in the protection of confidentiality
had an adverse impact? Has this openness diminished the willingness of air crash witnesses and informants to come forward
with a complete disclosure? If so, Congress may wish to amend
section 1441(e) in order to reemphasize and restore the absolute
privilege once given these reports.
Studies may indicate, however, that the use of accident reports
by civil litigants has not had a "chilling effect" upon the flow of
information to accident investigations. If this is so, then Congress
may nonetheless wish to amend section 1441(e). Congress should
take the initiative and enumerate guidelines that will provide added use of the NTSB accident reports, thereby obviating the need
for the judiciary to assume this legislative task.
There are three primary arguments consistently raised in opposition to use of the Board Aviation Accident Reports in trial proceedings. First, it is argued that informants and witnesses to
aviation accidents would be less frank in their statements to
Board investigators were it not for the privilege afforded the
Board's investigation report. Second, there persists the fear that
Board investigators and their reports would usurp the independent decision-making role of the judge/jury fact finder. Third, the
Board is opposed to the expense it incurs when its employees are
absent from their duties as public servants whenever they are
under subpoena to testify for private litigants.
The concern over maintaining the frankness of the Board's wit88. Berguido v. Eastern Airlines, 317 F.2d at 631.
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nesses is valid since the investigation's primary purpose is to aid
future air safety. Yet, by allowing air crash witnesses to designate their statements as "confidential," the shroud of protection
provided by section 1441(e) could be maintained on an elective
basis. All other statements and information would be provided to
the Board with the understanding that it might ultimately be
used at a court proceeding to assist in determining the probable
cause of the aviation accident. Such a policy would be consistent
with 49 U.S.C. § 1905(a), 8 9 which presently allows public access to
the Board's Aviation Accident Reports, including communications
made to the Board. The protection provided the Board's Aviation
Accident Reports under section 1441(e) applies only to court
proceedings.
A second argument is made by the attorneys themselves who
often express concern whenever Board accident reports or the
deposition of the Board's investigators are introduced into the
trial proceedings. The National Transportation Safety Board has
gained a tremendous amount of respect in the eyes of the American public. The organization's prestige would attach to its employees were they to testify in open court. The result would be
that a Board investigator would be held in higher esteem, and his
testimony would be overly persuasive before a panel of lay jurors.
Even a judge who finds himself less qualified in the area of technical aviation expertise might tend to rely heavily upon the conclusions drawn by the Board's investigation.
To alleviate this presumption of accuracy subconsciously afforded to Board investigators, the courts could instruct the jurors
that the witness is testifying as an individual and does not represent the position or view of the Board itself. The Board could go
further and instruct employees that they are not to reveal their
official employment, and thereafter their credibility as an expert
witness would depend on their individual education, training, experience, and credentials. When trial is by judge alone, an
amendment to section 1441(e) might include an admonition to the
judge that the Board's reports and testimony by its investigators
is deemed to represent the official government position only when
used for its designed purpose, i.e., that of future air safety. A caution could be further given that in determining civil liabilities, the
work product of the Board is limited by the human factors inher89. 49 U.S.C. § 1905(a) (1976).

ent in its preparation. The judge, just as the juror, must weigh
the Board investigator's testimony in light of his individual
qualifications.
Lastly, the National Transportation Safety Board, like all departments and agencies of the United States, has a responsibility
of carrying out its role within a limited and predetermined fiscal
budget. Each time an investigator employed by the Board is subpoenaed to participate in civil litigation, the manpower available
to the Board to investigate accidents is diminished. A modification to section 1441(e) might designate an expert witness fee that
civil litigants would pay to the Board whenever they use its investigators as experts. Hopefully the assessment of fees would act as
a limitation on the use of Board investigators as witnesses in private litigation. In any event, it would afford some compensation
to the government for the use of its employees.
The National Transportation Safety Board, through its role in
reducing accidents, has increased the productivity of this nation
by boosting the efficiency of transportation in the United States.
A revision of section 1441(e) might serve to enhance the already
fine job done by the investigators of the Board.

